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1. Antecedents of the research 
 
In the 20th and 21st centuries several researchers and 
thinkers were focusing on the political, social and economic 
history of both Finland and Hungary. Some of them even 
went so far as to compare the two countries.1 As to my 
research, Anssi Halmesvirta’s theory, defining inner and outer 
finlandization, served as a starting point. I tried to link elite-
changes with economic cycles and trends in these two 
countries. My study was particularly inspired by works of 
György Kövér, András Bródy, Tamás Bauer, Ferenc Jánossy 
and Károly Attila Soós. I analyzed changes of elites based on 
the literature of noted sociologists.2 Harmonizing the 
economic and social history required system-level analysis. 
Hereby related works of historians and economists have to be 
mentioned.3 
                                                          
1
 Dealing with Finnish and Hungarians topics: János Kodolányi and 
Domokos Varga (writers), Rudolf Andorka (sociologist). Among 
historians I emphasize works of Heino Nyyssönen, József Gombos, 
Gábor Richly and Ignác Romsics. Béla Tomka’s és Péter Márki-Zay’s 
comparative all-european works of social and/or economic history 
(dealing with Finland, too) are also important. 
2
 Works of the Hungarian sociologist, György Lengyel and the 
Finnish economist Juha Kansikas are very important. Among 
international researchers of elites, I should mention John Higley, 
Michael Burton and Tom Bottomore, in addition to the classical 
writings of Pareto and Max Weber. 
3
 System-level analysis is provided by economist János Kornai, 
political scientist Mihály Bihari, and by two historians: Tibor Valuch 
and János Rainer M. Among international thinkers, it is important to 
Why is economic growth so important? Herman van 
der Wee describes the ’Pentagon of Social Goals’ as full 
employment, maximum usage of productive capacities, stable 
prices, growing income, based on increasing productivity and 
a solid balance of payments. These goals can only be achieved 
through growth, which is the major element of the welfare 
state’s economic policy. It involves a precarious balancing act 
between growth and stability. Productivity improvement is 
the result of intensive growth, and not simply the expansion 
of input. 
Why is the ’Pentagon of Goals’ so important?  
According to Bentham (1748–1832) efficient government can 
provide maximum happiness for the maximum number of 
people. Bentham’s theory was based on the principle of 
utility. (He identified utility with happiness.) According to 
Bentham, people are motivated by two factors: joy and pain. 
Happiness can be quantified, therefore it can be calculated.  
Today we call it utility calculation. Researchers of 
macroeconomic growth examine actually how to maximalize 
the society’s happiness. 
Many data of such popular indexes as the GDP or the 
HDI (Human Development Index) proved to be wrong, also 
the method of their calculation often raised doubt. At the 
same time these figures  reveal important trends, less about a 
given country’s current situation, more about the changes 
during a given period. 
                                                                                                               
underline the works of Alec Nove, Immanuel Wallerstein and Daron 
Acemoglu, and the challenge-response-theory of Toynbee. 
However, growth is hardly enough for providing 
’happiness’. Allocation of surplus goods created by growth 
also influences the productivity of a country. And this is not 
just a question of fairness and justice. It is not about equality 
of allocation, but equality of opportunities. Welfare 
economics – in order to ensure economic effectiveness – 
permits some measure of unequality, but if it goes to the 
extreme, it could endanger efficiency itself. Consequently, 
both market forces and state intervention have their role. It is 
crucial that the „night-watchman” state (guarding over both 
the market economy, and freedom and equal opportunities) 
prevails over totalitarian states. 
According to the world-system theory, the ruling part 
of the divided (semi)peripherical elite, is not ready to practice 
self-restraint, and not too keen to strenghten the 
nightwatchman role of the state. The cultural division in the 
(semi)peripherical countries prevents consensus building 
between  members of the elite. Those elites are characterized 
by impatience, and feverish infighting for occupying key 
positions in the government. Contrary, self-restraint of elites 
prevails in some countries, including Finland. Cultural 
background of self-restraint in this Northern country includes 
lutheranism and its pietist movement 
According to Acemoglu, the most effective economic 
systems are those that have inclusive institutions and are 
strongly defending property rights. In Hungary, the safety of 
private ownership has repeatedly been in danger since 1918. 
In Finland, however, right of private property remained intact 
and stable over the last hundred years. In Hungary there were 
nationalization, war reparations, state initiated land 
distribution, collectivization (even of the land distributed by 
the state), privatization, reprivatization, racial discrimination, 
persecution of kulaks, deportations. These and many other 
measures weakened ownership rights in Hungary. These 
measures hindered strategic thinking and trust among 
members of the society, which led to uncertainty and 
disorganization in economic life.   
 
2. Research aims 
In my dissertation, I try to address the following questions: 
  
a) Which elite-change was more hectic, more violent, and 
bloodier:  the Hungarian or the Finnish? 
  
b) It seems that the consensually unified4 Finnish elite 
between 1945-1990 was much more efficient5 than the 
Hungarian elite during the same period.  I analize the change 
of the Hungarian elite-structure in various periods of that 45 
years time-span. I also examine, how it is related to the fact 
that Hungary’s economic performance was much weaker, 
compared to the Finnish one. 
 
                                                          
4
 Consensual elite accepts common rules of the game, and in the 
mean-time maintains pluralism of opinions. 
5
 Per capita GDP is considered as the most important 
measure/index of effectiveness. 
c) Is there some kind of "cyclical appearance" of supporters of 
the economic cycle? 
  
d) Did cycles exist at all in the Finnish and Hungarian 
economic performances between 1945 and 1990? If yes, how 
long  these fluctuations last? Can similar cycles be observed at 
changes of elites? Is there a link? 
  
e) An important  question that I raise in my dissertation: how 
does fluctuation of the economy correlate to the change of 
elites in Hungary and in Finland between 1945 and 1990? 
  
f) Was the so called Finnish ’economic (territorial) revision’ 
successful? Here I examine the effectiveness of a contract by 
which Helsinki regained considerable part of the disposal 
rights above Saimaa-canal (and has leased the canal for many 
years). 
  
g) Whether handling of critical economic turning points and 
the social embeddedness of the elite correlate with economic 
success? How can be Finnish and Hungarian economic 
development between 1945-90 modeled by the challenge-
response-theory of Toynbee? 
 
3. Research methods and sources 
 
My findings required research of many disciplines including 
history, sociology, political science, philosophy of history, 
statistics, and economics. As for statistics, I have used moving 
averages, trend-calculations. I have summarized longer and 
longer time spans by different moving averages. As for 
change of the elites, I have examined the changes of 
positional political and economic elite. My history science 
methods included archival research, source criticism, 
information gathering in data stores. That followed by 
structuring and analysis of data. Utilization of scientific 
literature was essential at writing chapters of philosophy of 
history, elite-theory and Soviet history. I needed the 
apparatus of comparatistics, because I compared historical 
events and procedures systematically. 
Essential sources of my research further included 
archival documents, parliamentary almanachs, works of 
József Bölöny (who gathered the data of Hungarian 
governmental leaders), Finnish governmental databases on 
the internet, Hungarian, English, Finnish, Swedish 
biographical encyclopedias. In addition to the data of Angus 
Maddison, I have used Finnish and Hungarian statistics of 
economy, as well as publications of companies for creating 
my database.  
 
4. New scientific results 
 
Comparing Finnish and Hungarian history, the two societies 
and the two economies, it has a considerable scientific 
literature. However, nobody has compared the economic 
growth of both countries in the same period from the point of 
view of changing elites. However after the Finnish economic 
crisis of 1990–93, Ilkka Ruostetsaari examined the correlation 
between the economic situation and the change of the 
Finnish elites.  
While examining Finnish and Hungarian trends 
between 1945 and 1990, I addressed the questions raised in 
the second chapter, describing the aims of the dissertation. I 
gave the following answers to the above mentioned 
questions:  
 
a) Hungarian change of elites was more hectic, more violent 
and bloodier than the Finnish one between 1945 and 1990. 
However Hungarian change has been softened, refined since 
the 1960s.  
 
b) Change of Hungarian elite was whether too hectic (1945–
57), or was damped down too much (1958–89). Hungarian 
political elite can be divided into three cathegories between 
1945 and 1990: i) political elite was divided and could not 
create an efficient and stable government (1945–48 and 
1953–56); ii) it was ideologically unified, and was attached to 
dogmatic principles, thus becoming inflexible, in the middle 
or long term. This ideologically unified elite led the country 
into economic chaos (1948–53 and 1957–89); iii) In the end of 
the era, Hungarian elite moved towards a consensually 
unified elite (1989–90). But in the whole period the Soviet 
type system in Hungary was unable to create a mechanism of 
constant but bloodless elite-rejuvenation. In the mean time 
consensually unified elites in Finland endorsed the constant 
and consistent economic growth of the country.  
 
c) Supporters and opponents of economic cycles emerge 
cyclically.  
 
d) Cyclical fluctuations can be observed both in Finnish and 
Hungarian economy. These fluctuations lasted approximately 
three years (e. g. the period, the time interval of the cycle was 
around three years). As for changes of elites, similar periodic 
fluctuations can be observed in both countries.  
 
e) The essential problem of my dissertation (How do 
fluctuations of economy correlate to the change of elites in 
Hungary and in Finland between 1945 and 1990?) can not be 
addressed shortly and easily. In Hungary as well as in Finland, 
the period around 1956 was the biggest turning point from 
the point of view of positional political elite-change. Thus the 
concept of inner finlandization was proven by my findings: 
the biggest change in Finland happened to be in 1957. (In 
Hungary the year of the most frequent political elite-change 
was 1956.) Finnish trends of economic growth and of political 
positional elite-change are inverse in the long term. Growing 
economy during the examined 45 years has been associated 
with decreasing elite-change ratio in the Northern country. In 
the short term, this could not be proven. In the cases of 
drastic Finnish economic growth two types of outcome were 
observed: the political positional elite-change has whether 
accelerated (in the end of the 60s), or lost momentum (in the 
beginning of the 60s). Drastic economic fall caused however 
in both countries increasing political positional elite-change 
on the top level. The change of the Hungarian economic elite 
lost momentum abruptly after the hyperactivity of 1956–57. 
The period of deceleration lasted from 1958 till 1989. The 
trend of Hungarian positional economic elite-change is 
downside, and change does not correlate to the fluctuations 
of the GDP, rather depended on the political elite-change.  
 
f) Influence of the Kremlin on economic decisions can be 
observed in both countries between 1945 and 1990. It was 
weaker in Finland, and the role of the Soviet Union was 
different in Helsinki: in addition to influencing economy there 
were also signs of gesture politics. For example by the so 
called Finnish ’economic (territorial) revision’ (the leasing of 
Saimaa-canal by Finland), Moscow helped the industry and 
forestry of the Finnish lakes region. It was a political interest 
of the Kremlin: Moscow supported its Finnish protegé, Urho 
Kekkonen, the president, by helping his electoral base in the 
lakes region.   
 
g) Acemoglu distinguished critical turning points in 
(economic) history. The Finnish elite handled the challenges 
at such turning points very successfully. The embeddedness 
of the Finnish elite endorsed the decisions which were 
economically effective and helped the measures which 
guarded the social order and the social system. Taking into 
consideration Toynbee’s challenge-response theory, the 
Finnish elite gave good responses to five challenges, thus 
Finland had to face new and even newer challenges, each 
after the other. Contrary to the Finnish development, the 
Hungarian political elite made wrong decisions, that is why it 
„crashed into the wall’ again and again between 1945 and 
1990. And because of the wrong decisions followed each 
other, Hungary faced always the same challenge. This was 
marked by repeating investitional cycles in the economy.  
 
h) An important finding of my research has been reached 
without prior hypothesis: Finnish consensual elite was held 
together by tight links. One of the reasons of this 
phenomenon is the frequency of cousinhood, which helped to 
preserve intact elites during the time of finlandization. Every 
fifth of the examined units of person/position/year was held 
by such a person, who had relatives occupying other political 
positions in Finland, whether these persons held positions 
before or during or after the examined period. Thus 
interknitted Finnish political elite defended the local 
economic elite from direct Soviet influence.  
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